Israel's War Plan

This war is liable to last longer and take more unpredictable turns than previous wars.  The regional and international powers that would typically push for a cease fire are not engaged this time:

• Washington foreign policy siesta:  failed to back rebels in Syria, failed to directly confront Assad, allowed Russia to take over as mediator on chem weapons.  Also AWOL on Ukraine and gave up on Mideast peace process.  If the Obama Administration was expected to hold the sides back from escalation, forget it.

• New Egypt not inclined to mediate.  Egypt was always the key intermediary in past rounds.  But current government is sworn enemy of Muslim Brotherhood and its Palestinian branch Hamas.  Meanwhile Islamic Jihad seen from Cairo as Iranian agents.  If anything Egypt is happy to see Hamas squirm, at least to the point at which humanitarian crisis in Gaza could undermine Egyptian interests.  Long way from there on Day 3.

• Arab countries consumed with their own very serious problems, particularly Syria and Iraq which is spilling over to threaten other countries (Saudi, Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon).  If Palestinians complained in other wars with Israel that the Arab nations didn’t help them enough, this episode will set a new record. 

At face value, the absence of limitations on its air war should benefit Israel.  But this is a short-term consideration because the air war will not succeed in stopping the rocket fire. Why?

• Hamas and other groups have capacity to sustain bombardment of Israel.  They won’t run out of rockets anytime soon.  Israel’s hi-tempo air war will not succeed in physically preventing rocket fire or deter the firing crews from continuing it.

• Meanwhile, Iron Dome has performed brilliantly but is no match for the Gaza rocket arsenal over time.  There are too few batteries and too few interceptors total to sustain a long campaign.  As the saturation attacks gradually overwhelm the system, Israeli damage and casualties will increase along with momentum for land war.   First signs of this already today, the third day of war.  Incoming rockets got through in Beer Sheva, Ashdod and at a forward staging area for Israeli troops near Erez. 

The much-anticipated ground invasion of Gaza will disappoint its proponents.  The government will be very cautious to avoid Israeli casualties, which the receiving parties have meticulously prepared to inflict.   And in this day and age, not only can soldiers not be killed in battle but also cannot run the risk of capture, since prisoners have strategic consequences for Israel.   The ground war will be long on big bangs and flashes for the TV audiences in Tel Aviv and short on strategic benefits for Israel. 

Rhetoric in Israel about “just recapture the Gaza Strip and finish Hamas” is wishful thinking.  Not going to happen (unless Israeli casualties become much more severe) because implementation would cost many hundreds of Israeli lives in direct combat and more on the home front.  In Israel’s “glory days” of 1956 and 1967, Palestinians were not willing to die to defend their turf (this likely didn’t even occur to them as an option).  In case anyone needed this highlighted, those days are over.  Most likely is attempted capture of rural northeastern Strip, avoiding the cities.

Netanyahu sees this war as distraction from his mission on this earth:  to prevent a second Holocaust from a nuclear armed Iran.  He wants to keep all gunpowder dry (warfighting capacity and political capital) for this ultimate showdown.  The war from Gaza, notwithstanding its chutzpa and "no country in the world would tolerate this" etc., is a distraction from the main event.  Netanyahu’s main objective is to end this war as quickly as possible without looking desperate.    The signposts are clear:   

• Israeli government has authorized callup of only 40,000 reservists.  In 2012, when the rocket attacks were far less serious, the number was 75,000.  Moreover the real number of reservists isn’t the one authorized by the government, which is hypothetical, but rather the subset that is actually pulled out of their jobs and families and sent to the front lines.  
• Not a word from Israel - government or military - about an Iranian hand in enabling Hamas et al.  Contrast that with 2008 and 2012 when Israel portrayed Hamas attacks as proxy war managed from Tehran. 

Israel has two serious weak cards that constrain its warfighting options:   It is highly averse to casualties and to costly military reserve mobilization.  At face value, Hamas and other groups (PIJ, PRC) are paradoxically helping Israel overcome these issues and build consensus for costly war by bombarding its cities and towns.   But this is simply a trap to drag Israel further into the morass of Gaza, where Hamas and other fighting forces have significant advantages.

In Protective Edge’s conservative air war and the expected cautious ground war, it seems Israel may finally have internalized somewhat the limits of its military power – brutal lessons learned over many decades, including the Second Lebanon War in 2006.  But this likely won’t last.  The adage is that no battle plan survives first contact with the enemy.  Also true regarding sentiment and intentions.  As casualties mount, the desire for payback (already quite acute after the murder of the yeshiva boys and the al-Kheidr boy) will pressure the government to increase the pain for the other side.  So this is how it will escalate despite intentions, when the troops go in.

MH370 Abruptly Turned Toward US Strategic Base

Observation 1:  MH370 abrupt turn consistent with hijack

Exhibit A





Exhibit B:  September 11, 2001



Observation 2:  MH370's abrupt turn put it on heading toward Diego Garcia





   Heading 246 degrees

Observation 3:  US Strategic Bombers based at Diego Garcia

B-52s on flight line, opposite four B-2 stealth bomber hangers

Mideast Forecast after Iran Deal: Partly to Mostly Violent

The Iran deal seems like a slam dunk for Iran, which will apparently:

*  Obtain very significant sanctions relief, at least $7 billion during the six month period

*  Keep its enriched uranium and continue enrichment activity, albeit with limitations

*  Keep its enrichment equipment, albeit with inspections at declared facilities

*  Have no monitoring of its weaponization activities or constraints on missile development

*  Have de facto guarantee of no Western military threat and removal of associated leverage 

Naturally Iran's leadership received the win ecstatically.  Israel's leadership may justifiably have required more time to digest all of the details and their ramifications, since the disclosure of the Oman negotiations was withheld from Israel until the outcome was effectively a done deal.

The Iran deal completely abandons the six UN resolutions that had demanded a cessation of all Iranian uranium enrichment activity, which required many years of difficult diplomatic achievements and securing the cooperation of very unwilling participants like Russia and China.  Takeaway message:  intransigence, defiance and covert progress will eventually cause the international community to cave.

Washington has essentially purchased a six month “limited limitation” on Iranian uranium enrichment activities for at least $7 billion.  This is money that can be used to advance Iranian weapons programs, expand its warfighting activity in Syria and further bolster Hezbollah in Lebanon. 

The Administration’s spin alleging that sanctions can easily be reinstated is dubious.  Regardless of what’s decided in the US Senate, it will be difficult if not impossible to reinstate the sanctions that have been lifted in this deal.  To the contrary, Iran will certainly demand additional sanctions relief in May and the Administration will probably endorse that too lest the entire enterprise come to naught.

The biggest problem with the deal is not that Iran will become a nuclear weapons power in 6 months.  That is very unlikely given what we know about their program, well outlined by Tony Cordesman.

As Michael Doran explains, what makes this deal historically significant is America’s retreat from global and Middle East regional leadership, especially following the Obama Administration’s acquiescence to Syria’s use of WMD earlier this year.  Now we know that Obama was deeply involved in the Oman negotiations during and even before Assad’s nerve gas attack.  Obama’s decision to stay on the sidelines was no doubt influenced by these negotiations.  In other words, his irrational exuberance for a six month enrichment limitation deal enabled Assad to get away with mass murder, and clearly telegraphed the reality that the US is no longer the global enforcer. 

The historical era of America’s challenge to global tyranny, already being unwound in the pullbacks from Iraq and Afghanistan, was finally lowered into the ground and buried along with the murdered children of East Ghouta (suburb of Damascus in gas weapon attack). 

The revised Mideast forecast:  partly to mostly violent.  Saudi and other Gulf nations will double down on proxy fight against Iran and Hezbollah.  Natural byproduct will be gains for al-Qaida linked groups.  Israel will continue attacking targets in Syria and likely expand operations into Lebanon.  Iran and Assad will capitalize on leverage with expanded combat operations in Syria in attempt to roll back rebel gains.  Saudi will waste no time in at least catching up to if not surpassing Iran’s nuclear capability; Egypt will move to active planning.

The Least Bad Option

Thanks to my man @dwaghalter for helping transform ramblings into an essay

Here's the big picture about Syria:  neither the Obama Administration nor Congressional leaders have defined a geopolitical outcome that promotes US national security interests. 

So I'll just do it.

First to recap:  all we hear about is what we don't want:

1.  We don't want more atrocities from Assad against the Syrian people

2.  We don't want other rogue states to get the message that they can use WMD

3.   We don't want Syria to become an al-Qaida base

4.  We don't want Syria to become (remain) an instrument for Iranian hostility 

5.  We don't want to get mixed up in a Sunni-Shia ethnic conflict

6.  We don't want a costly new Middle Eastern war as measured both in economic terms and in the sacrifices of American military families

All of these are legitimate things to want to avoid.  However just like I tell my daughters, you can't always have everything you want.  Sometimes you can only have some of what you want.  And the corollary:  sometimes we have to change our plan.

With all due respect to President Obama's longstanding policies, the fragile status of the American economy and our love and concern for our military families, the right answer in Syria is military intervention, because it is the only way to shape a political outcome that promotes US national security interests.  And as Colin Powell said when referencing Vietnam in preparing for Desert Storm:  from now on when we go, we go all the way, to the end, with full political and material commitment to the armed forces that's needed to accomplish the mission.  I'll outline the military concept in a subsequent post, but rest assured it puts much of the heavy lifting on Arab and other regional allies.

Let's get this out of the way - don't fight the last war again:  The neocons were wrong about going to war in Iraq. They were wrong to cite unreliable evidence of WMD as justification, and they were wrong to connect Saddam to 9/11.  Those mistakes/misrepresentations are over and done with.  

This is a new chapter with new circumstances, and Obama is wrong to let the Iraq experience dictate or limit our actions in Syria.  They say that generals often make the mistake of trying to fight the current war just like the previous war.  Today we see Obama and many in Congress mistakenly approaching Syria policy through the lens of the previous war. 

Some have criticized Obama for delaying an attack until consulting with Congressional leaders and receiving their approval.  I disagree - I think consultations and endorsement are a very important and necessary step.   
My problem is why are we having this discussion in September 2013?  The Obama Administration should have checked this off the list 12-18 months ago.  The inexcusable delay has hurt the United States, helped Iran and gotten a whole lot more Syrian civilians killed than could have been the case, in addition to further destabilizing Lebanon and Jordan.  
  In the list above, the most important elements are 3 and 4.  We cannot let Syria or parts of it become a base for al-Qaida, global jihad or other elements that threaten US national security interests.  And we cannot let Iran fill the vacuum after Assad. 

The next most important priority is preventing the current regime and its successor from carrying out widespread murder and persecution of Syrian citizens.

Hearing about the 100,000+ human toll in the Syrian civil war, much of which are civilian deaths inflicted by the regime (even before the chemical warfare):  I'm reminded of two photos of the Auschwitz death camp.  One (among a very large series) was taken in 1944, showing that the Allies knew of its existence and could reach it repeatedly with warplanes.  The second was taken in 2003, when Israeli Air Force F-15s overflew the site, carrying on board the names of every known Auschwitz victim.  The message, of course, is "never again."  And we all assumed that the combination of the information age and the F-15s could ensure never again. 

The situations are hardly analogous in scope, intent or numbers.  But the question remains - was the lesson of "never again" a universal one, or limited to certain groups?  Is there a minimum number of deaths in a campaign of ethnic cleansing etc., below which the lesson (and our obligations) does not apply?  

How do we know when we're facing a "never again" decision? 

On a possibly related note, here's one more photo, an Iranian Revolutionary Guard missile base outside of Khorammabad, Iran that's believed to house hundreds of ballistic missiles and launchers (courtesy Digital Globe and Google Earth).  It's about 5.2 miles from end to end, about the distance from Manhattan's Battery Park to E 70th Street.  One of several such facilities.

Egypt: Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right

Watching events unfold in Cairo and throughout Egypt, it's easy to endorse a massively popular non-violent movement pushing for progressive change in the largest Arab country.  Enthusiasm for this sentiment is justified.  However one of the most important attributes in a democracy (system of laws) is that the ends don't justify any means.  

How did Egypt's experiment with democracy get off track, and how can it get back on track?  The biggest wrong turn was when President Morsi seized unconstitutional powers back in November 2012.  What has happened since, and particularly the Tamrod movement that has mobilized millions and culminated in this week's massive demonstrations calling for his removal, was entirely predictable.

Having said that, let's not forget that Morsi was democratically elected.  A tweet from @evanchill cuts to the chase:  "What's the word you'd use to describe an army deployment to the streets, a missing president, and three unelected guys offering a roadmap?" 

Do the people have the right to protest against him and call for him to resign?  Absolutely.  If he declines to resign, and if there is no court order to compel it, then do the demonstrators have the right to threaten violence, and does the army have the right to depose him?  Absolutely not. 

The worst possible message that observers/friends like the United States could send is that election results in Arab/Muslim countries can be neutralized for the sake of expediency. 

In justifying his removal, Morsi opponents have thrown in every complaint except the kitchen sink:  high unemployment, power blackouts, insufficient benefits etc. 

Guess what guys:  grappling with those problems within the law is democracy.  Treating the elected leader like a punching bag for all the nation's flaws is democracy.  Mobilizing to oust him in the next election is democracy.  Welcome, at long last, to the party!

Now there is a limit to the preaching I can conduct from my secure location at Taco Cabana.  With millions of protestors marauding at all hours, some armed (and apparently not a few rapists among them), the security forces certainly have a duty to ensure public safety, physical ability for government work to function, and protection of property.  So this deployment was probably necessary in any case. 

Our messaging, however, is important.  The ends don't justify the means. 

Tomorrow, Americans gather with family and friends to celebrate our successful drive for independence, freedom and equality under the law.  We've been working at this for 237 years, and still a work in progress.  It can't be fast tracked. 

Fed up with your elected leaders and not gonna take it anymore?  Great, get in line. 

Syria: What You Need to Know

Friends are increasingly asking me how to interpret the latest developments in the Syrian civil war.  I think one of the best explanations comes from Toby Matthisen, who calls it "a war about the future of the Middle East."  Matthisen tells the story of how Sayyida Zainab, a Shia shrine southeast of Damascus, became a magnet for non-Syrian Shia in recent decades, and also today as Shia fighters have come to defend the Assad regime.  Although the face-value story is religious in nature, the real story is geopolitical, specifically the expansion of Iranian influence into Baathist (secular) Syria.  The key events in the ensuing years following the Iranian Revolution are seen through this lens, from the end of the Iran-Iraq war to the creation of Hezbollah to the 1991 Iraqi Shia uprising.  But Matthisen sees beyond the sectarian story to focus on the real motivation of the parties in Syria today:

It might be tempting to view Shia fighters traveling to a foreign country to defend a religious shrine as the final realization of an age-old battle that started with the schism of Islam after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Such a simplistic reading is, however, deeply misleading. Sayyida Zainab—a shrine whose status as a site of Shia religious pilgrimage was largely created in the 1980s and 1990s—lies at the heart of a strategic relationship between the Assad regime, Iran, and Arab Shia groups. This relationship uses religious symbols and sectarian language but it is driven far more by geo-strategic interests than faith. The various groups that profit from a further sectarianization of the conflict, this time on the Shia side, are to blame. These include Iran, which is trying to re-establish its influence over all Shia political movements and groups, whether in the Gulf, in Iraq or elsewhere. 

Veteran Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi suggests that an Iranian win in Syria would directly undermine Saudi Arabia national security mainly because it would increase anger and political extremism at home.  For this reason, he predicts, Saudi Arabia will not allow an Iranian victory in which the Assad regime remains in power.  According to Khashoggi, "Iran’s presence in Lebanon and Syria now constitutes a clear threat to Saudi Arabia’s national security, and Turkey’s as well."

It will be good if the United States joined an alliance led by Saudi Arabia to bring down Assad and return Syria to the Arab fold. But this should not be a precondition to proceed.  Let Saudi Arabia head those on board.  Let us put aside any misgivings about sequels of the Arab Spring, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s ambitions.  Let the objective be to bring down Assad fast.  The objective is bound to draw together multiple forces ranging from the Anbar tribes to Hamas to Egypt’s Brothers to Tunisia to the Gulf Countries.  That would entice Turkey to partake in the alliance. France could follow. And whether the United States does or does not breeze in is inconsequential. After all, it’s our battle and our security. U.S. security is not on the line.

Missiles & Maps Bring Israel-Iran War to Damascus

I'm inclined to believe the face value story of Israel's weekend attacks on military installations in Damascus:  the objective was to interdict major weapons transfers to Hezbollah. 
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From the Israeli perspective, the next skirmish with Iran via Hezbollah is not just imminent - it's ongoing.  Thus Israel has (first in January and now in May) been preemptively attacking the enemy’s supply chain in Syria, before the weapons reach Lebanon.  This was also the case with ships at sea and factories in far-off Sudan.

It's true that the late-model Fatah 110 would offer Hez game-changing firepower:  

• Solid-fuel propellant means rapid launch preparation, less likely to be detected in advance

• Road-mobile launchers (mounted on trucks) can more easily avoid detection and evade attackers

• Relatively long range (by Israel-Hezbollah battlefield standards - 300 km) puts most of Israel's sensitive facilities in range even from deep within Lebanon

• Precision guidance (100 meter margin of error) and heavy warhead (up to 1,100 pounds) mean that specific Israeli targets could be destroyed.   

This last element is perhaps the biggest factor that has changed since the classic Arab-Israeli wars were fought in previous decades.  In a world with Google Earth and similar mapping/imagery software platforms, there are no more secrets regarding the location of fixed targets in any country:  runway intersections, missile bunkers, armories, motor pools and command posts.  Today these are all visible in granular detail  - even with precise latitude/longitude coordinates - from any computer in the world.  Suitable granularity is even available on cell phones and other mobile devices.  This combination of precision guided munitions and targeting knowledge in Iranian proxy hands is new, thus the threshold for constituting game-changing firepower that can alter the balance of power is redefined.  Although yes it doesn't hurt that the Syrian armed forces are diminished and stretched, and Israel's decision might have been different 3+ years ago.

Sidebar:  Recognizing that Google and others have already permanently revealed Israel's top secrets to the whole world, Israel has apparently picked a more limited fight with the software giant - how to label Palestine on its world map. 

Therefore from Israel's view, even though the missiles had not yet set out for Lebanon, why pass up the opportunity to hit them in the airport warehouse?  Why wait until the missiles are delivered and hidden away in forests, urban areas or secret tunnels when they can be neutralized now at low risk?   

Intentional or Not, Geopolitical Signals are Sent

Best assessment is that damage to Syrian Republican Guard units on Mount Qassiyoun was incidental, not intended.  To the contrary, Israel has been putting out word that it is neutral in the Syrian civil war and not out to hit the Assad regime.  Nevertheless, Washington and the rest of the international community are left with some clear take away messages from the Israeli strikes in the Damascus area that also apparently hit regime security forces:

To the all-talk Assad opponents:  you guys are sissies.  Sure an all-out crushing of Syria's air defenses would be a formidable task, but you should be ashamed for not trying harder. 

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To Tehran and everyone else watching:  Israel has the technical means and the resolve to overcome obstacles in order to destroy important enemy targets.   We can sustain operations like this around the clock for months.  We now have a solid track record of action when our red lines get crossed.   Cross the next one at your own risk.

To Assad, Iran and Hezbollah:  crazy coincidence that those Republican Guards (vital to regime survival) got caught up in all this.  If you were depending on those guys and similar units to protect a retreat to the northwestern coastal enclave, better rethink -  they're questionable for game day. 

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Meanwhile, not all the geopolitical signals come from the tip of the sword - some come from the tip of the fountain pen.  One big impediment to international intervention in Syria has been the schism between Israel and Turkey.  Syria and Iran have benefited from the split, but this chapter may be drawing to an end with the expected signing of a deal for Israel to compensate Turkey for damages from the Mavi Marmara episode. They say that a picture's worth a thousand words , and this one has been prominently featured in Ankara for a couple of months now.